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SUBJECT: NATO POLADS SPECIAL STUDIES: SINO-SOVIET-JAPANESE
RELATIONSHIP

REF: USNATO 2128 (NOTAL)

1. THERE FOLLOWS BELOW US CONTRIBUTION TO SUBJECT STUDY.
2. BEGIN TEXT: A REVIEW OF THE SINO-SOVIET-JAPANESE
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RELATIONSHIP

A. THE ADVENT OF DETENTE DIPLOMACY IN THE EARLY 1970S
INTENSIFIED THE SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE IN
TOKYO. THEIR PREVIOUSLY SHARED GOAL OF REDUCING US
INFLUENCE IN JAPAN BECAME LESS IMPORTANT TO THEM THAN
THE GOAL OF PREVENTING EITHER FROM SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVING
ITS POSITION IN TOKYO. BOTH MOSCOW AND PEKING ALSO WERE
ANXIOUS TO SECURE ACCESS TO JAPANESE TECHNOLOGY AND CREDITS
FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS.

B. ASSETS FOR COMPETITION. CHINA ENJOYED CERTAIN ADVANTAGES IN THE COMPETITION DERIVING FROM A LONG HISTORY OF

CONTACT AND INTERACTION WITH JAPAN, JAPANESE GUILT ABOUT WARTIME TREATMENT OF THE CHINESE, THE ETHNIC SENTIMENTS IN JAPAN FAVORING BETTER ASIAN TIES, CHINA'S POTENTIAL AS A MARKET FOR JAPANESE GOODS, AND EVENTUALLY, PEKING'S SUPPORT FOR THE US-JAPANESE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. MOSCOW, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD DEFINITE LIABILITIES STEMMING FROM HISTORICAL CONFLICTS, ITS WORLD WAR II AND POST-WAR TREATMENT OF JAPAN, ITS CRITICISM OF THE US-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP, PERENNIAL PROBLEMS OVER FISHERIES, AND FINALLY, ITS REFUSAL TO RETURN THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES -- A GROUP OF ISLANDS JUST NORTH OF KOKKAIDO THE USSR SEIZED IN THE CLOSING DAYS OF WORLD WAR II. SOVIET DISADVANTAGES, HOWEVER, WERE SOMEWHAT OFFSET BY JAPAN'S RESPECT FOR SOVIET MILITARY POWER IN THE FAR EAST, ITS DESIRE FOR CONTINUED ACCESS TO SOVIET FISHING GROUNDS AND THE RAW MATERIALS OF SOVIET SIBERIA. AS A RESULT, JAPAN ADOPTED AN OFFICIAL POLICY OF "EQUIDISTANCE," I.E., TRYING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH BOTH COUNTRIES SIMULTANEOUSLY. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY HAS HAD A
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PERCEPTIBLE "TILT" TOWARD THE PRC.

SINO-US RAPPROCHEMENT IN 1971 AND THE RESTORATION OF SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN 1972 PROMPTED MOSCOW TO INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO COURT JAPAN AND TO SECURE US AND JAPANESE INVOLVEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE USSR'S SIBERIAN ENERGY RESOURCES. THEY ALSO PROMPTED MOSCOW TO REDUCE ITS SUPPORT OF NORTH KOREAN LEADER KIM IL-SONG'S EFFORTS TO SECURE KOREAN REUNIFICATION ON HIS TERMS.

CHINA COUNTERED WITH SIMILAR EFFORTS TO RESTRAIN KIM, PUBLICLY ENDORSED THE US-JAPANESE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, ABANDONED EFFORTS TO CURTAIN JAPANESE ECONOMIC DEALINGS WITH TAIWAN, AND SOUGHT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IT, NOT THE USSR, WAS THE MORE PROMISING ECONOMIC PARTNER (E.G., CHINA'S OFFER OF OIL TO JAPAN IN THE AFTERMATH OF JAPAN'S DECISION TO FOREGO INVESTING THE TYUMEN PROJECT).

CHINA'S WILLINGNESS TO BEGIN PEACE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN EVIDENTLY PROMPTED MOSCOW'S AGREEMENT TO RESUME SIMILAR SOVIET-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN SUSPENDED SINCE 1956.

C. THE ANTI-HEGEMONY ISSUE. SINO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN IN NOVEMBER 1973. AT THE OUTSET, IT WAS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR THAT THE ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE CHINA PROPOSED INCLUDING IN THE TREATY WAS AIMED SOLELY AT THE USSR

BUT BY EARLY 1975 THE CHINESE HAD CLARIFIED THEIR INTENTIONS AND THE SOVIETS WERE OBJECTING VIGOROUSLY TO TOKYO'S

SEEMING WILLINGNESS TO CONCLUDE SUCH AN "OBVIOUSLY ANTI-SOVIET DOCUMENT." PRIVATE SOVIET COMMENTS AT THAT TIME SUGGEST MOSCOW WAS NOT SANGUINE ABOUT ITS ABILITY TO PREVENT A TREATY; RATHER IT HOPED TO DILUTE THE IMPACT EITHER BY PERSUADING JAPAN TO ISSUE A DISCLAIMER DISAVOWING ANY ANTI-SOVIET INTENT, OR BY PERSUADING JAPAN TO MAKE
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SOME COMPENSATORY GESTURES TOWARD THE USSR. ONE SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS THAT THE TWO SIDES CONCLUDE AN INTERIM FRIENDSHIP PACT. IT WAS FIRST ADVANCED TO THE JAPANESE DURING FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA'S VISIT TO THE USSR IN JANUARY 1975, BUT ONLY PUBLICIZED BY THE SOVIETS IN PRAVDA THIS PAST FEBRUARY 23.

FOR ITS PART TOKYO IMMEDIATELY REJECTED THE IDEA OF ANY PACT THAT WOULD SET ASIDE THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION AND PROFESSED TO BE UNINTIMIDATED BY MOSCOW'S PRESSURE TACTICS, BUT SOVIET REPRESENTATIONS NEVERTHELESS SEEM TO HAVE HAD SOME EFFECT. IN ANY EVENT SINO-JAPANESE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN STALEMATED OVER THE ANTI-HEGEMONY ISSUE SINCE EARLY 1975, BECAUSE CHINA HAS REFUSED TO SANCTION ANY JAPANESE EFFORT TO WEAKEN THE TREATY'S ANTI-SOVIET THRUST.

D. THE MOMENTUM SLOWS. THE SLOWDOWN IN US RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE USSR AFTER 1974 WAS PARALLELED IN TOKYO'S CASE AS WELL, ALTHOUGH NOT FOR THE SAME REASONS. JAPANESE TRADE WITH BOTH COUNTRIES HAS CONTINUED TO EXPAND; IN 1977 IT WAS NEARLY \$3.5 BILLION WITH CHINA AND \$3.4 BILLION WITH THE USSR. BUT SOVIET BALANCE OF PAYMENT PROBLEMS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE DISASTROUS 1975 HARVEST COOLED JAPANESE ARDOR FOR UNILATERALLY EXTENDING ADDITIONAL LARGE LONG-TERM CREDITS TO THE USSR. AND THE INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF NON-COMMUNIST OIL PROMPTED THE JAPANESE TO BARGAIN HARD BEFORE FINALIZING ITS RECENTLY CONCLUDED \$20 BILLION LONG-TERM (1977-85) TRADE AGREEMENT WITH PEKING.

ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, TOKYO MADE ONLY LIMITED PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING BETTER RELATIONS WITH BOTH. CHINA, TOO, SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE PEACE TREATY IMPASSE FROM IMPEDING
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CLOSER TIES. LOWER-LEVEL CONTACTS HAVE PROLIFERATED ON A WHOLE HOST OF ISSUES; AMONG THE MORE SIGNIFICANT WAS THE RECENT VISIT BY JAPANESE ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY OFFICERS TO PEKING FOR TALKS WITH THEIR CHINESE COUNTERPARTS.

(PROPOSALS FOR THESE CONTACTS WERE INITIATED BY THE CHINESE. JAPAN SUBSEQUENTLY SOUGHT TO INITIATE A SIMILAR DIALOGUE WITH MOSCOW AND SENT OFFICERS TO MOSCOW AT THE SAME TIME AS THE VISIT TO PEKING, BUT THE SOVIETS SHOWED

LITTLE INTEREST IN SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE.) THERE HAS BEEN TROUBLE, HOWEVER, OVER JAPAN'S CONCLUSION OF A CONTINENTAL SHELF AGREEMENT WITH SEOUL BECAUSE CHINA CLAIMS SOME OF THE TERRITORY COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT AND THE IMPASSE OVER THE TREATY APPARENTLY HAS DISCOURAGED ANY ADDITIONAL SINO-JAPANESE SUMMITRY. NEITHER SIDE IS WILLING TO STAKE ITS PRESTIGE ON A VISIT UNTIL THE TREATY ISSUE APPEARS RESOLVABLE.

MOSCOW HAS SOUGHT TO IMPROVE ITS IMAGE IN JAPAN AND TO INCREASE ITS POLITICAL CONTACTS, BUT THE USSR'S HARDENING OF ITS POSITION ON THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION AFTER 1974, ITS BEHAVIOR OVER THE DEFECTION OF A MIG-25 PILOT IN SEPTEMBER 1976, AND ITS EFFORTS TO CURTAIL JAPANESE FISHING IN THE USSR'S NEWLY DECLARED 200-MILE ECONOMIC ZONE IN 1977, HAVE DONE NOTHING TO IMPROVE ITS ALREADY POOR IMAGE IN TOKYO. SOVIET BULLYING OF JAPAN PROBABLY WAS DETERMINED BY A VARIETY OF CONSIDERATIONS, AMONG THEM:

-- FEAR THAT FLEXIBILITY ON THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE WOULD UNDERCUT SOVIET POSITIONS ON TERRITORIAL INVIOABILITY ELSEWHERE, PARTICULARLY VIS-A-VIS CHINA;

-- CONCERN ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY TO LIMIT US TECHNICAL AND PROPAGANDA EXPLOITATION OF THE MIG INCIDENT; AND

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-- THE NEED TO MAKE UP IN SOVIET WATERS FISHING CATCHES LOST ELSEWHERE BECAUSE OF WORLD-WIDE 200-MILE ECONOMIC ZONE DECLARATIONS.

UNDERLYING ALL, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO BE A SOVIET PERCEPTION THAT THE JAPANESE ARE VULNERABLE TO PRESSURE TACTICS. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY CREDIT THEIR VIOLENT REACTION ON THE MIG-25 AFFAIR WITH CURTAILING US EXPLOITATION OF THE PLANE AND SECURING ITS ULTIMATE RETURN. LIKEWISE, AFTER NEARLY FIVE YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS, THEY PROBABLY BELIEVE THEIR TACTICS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY STRENGTHENED JAPANESE OPPOSITION TO CONCLUDING A SINO-JAPANESE PEACE TREATY ON CHINESE TERMS, AND SO PROBABLY WILL NOT LIGHTLY ABANDON THIS APPROACH.

E. THE FUTURE. BEFORE THE RECENT SENKAKUS INCIDENT, IT APPEARED THAT TOKYO WAS SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN WORKING OUT A COMPROMISE ON THE HEGEMONY ISSUE. THAT AFFAIR

TEMPORARILY DISRUPTED ITS PLANS TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS

WITH PEKING. JAPAN HOWEVER, HAS ACCEPTED THE OFFICIAL CHINESE EXPLANATION THAT THE REPEATED INCURSIONS BY, AT TIMES OVER 200, CHINESE FISHING JUNKS INTO JAPANESE-CLAIMED TERRITORIAL WATERS WAS "ACCIDENTAL." TOKYO HAS AGAIN EXPRESSED ITS INTENTION TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS. BUT CHINESE BEHAVIOR ALMOST CERTAINLY HAS HEIGHTENED JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CONCERN OVER CHINA'S LONG-TERM INTENTIONS AND DAMAGED THE BENEFICIENT IMAGE OF CHINA AMONG THE JAPANESE PUBLIC.

THE JAPANESE EXPECT THAT CONCLUSION OF THE SINO-JAPANESE TREATY, EVEN WITH A DISCLAIMER FROM TOKYO DISAVOWING ANY ANTI-SOVIET INTENT, WILL LEAD TO A SHARP DOWNTURN IN THEIR
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RELATIONS WITH THE USSR OVER THE SHORT-TERM AND CERTAIN RETALIATION IN THE FISHERIES AREA. BUT THEY ARE PROBABLY RIGHT IN CALCULATING THAT THE USSR'S INTEREST IN CONTINUED ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH JAPAN WILL MITIGATE SOVIET BEHAVIOR OVER THE LONG TERM. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, NOTABLY PARTY LEADER BREZHNEV'S AND PREMIER KOSYGIN'S TRIPS TO THE SOVIET FAR EAST AND THEIR EMPHASIS ON ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT OF SIBERIA, PROBABLY HAVE ONLY STRENGTHENED THAT ASSESSMENT.

JAPANESE CONCERN ABOUT NOT APPROVING TO TILT TOO FAR TOWARD THE CHINESE IS SUCH THAT IT WILL TRY TO PLACATE THE SOVIETS EVEN IN THE SHORT TERM. IT ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL PROPOSE CONCLUDING A LONGER TERM TRADE AGREEMENT WITH MOSCOW, SIMILAR TO THE ONE RECENTLY SIGNED TO PEKING. IT PROBABLY WILL NOT BE ANY MORE FORTHCOMING THAN HERETOFORE TOWARD MOSCOW'S PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM FRIENDSHIP PACT. BUT IT MAY COUNTER WITH A PROPOSAL, FIRST BROACHED BY AN ADVISER TO A FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER IN A FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARTICLE IN 1975. HE SUGGESTED JAPAN AGREE TO CONCLUDE SUCH A PACT CONDITIONAL ON THE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF THE PART OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES THE SOVIETS OFFERED PREVIOUSLY TO JAPAN, AND A SOVIET COMMITMENT TO RETURN THE REMAINDER IN 25 YEARS.

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CHRISTOPHER

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